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 3 
Introduction 
 
People as social beings regularly get each other to do what they want in a variety of 
ways. But not every way is morally unproblematic. According to Immanuel Kant, we are 
doing something wrong when we treat others merely as means, and not also as ends in 
themselves. We ought to respect others as rational beings, and manipulation is 
incompatible with such respect. At the same time, Kant believes that people should have 
courage to use their own understanding without the direction of another. If a person lacks 
such courage, then she lives in the state of self-incurred immaturity, which makes her 
particularly susceptible to manipulation. For Kant, her unwillingness to use her own 
understanding is a failure to respect humanity in her own person; hence it is a moral 
failure. 
My project can be summed up as the reconstruction of Kant’s theory of 
manipulation. While I touch upon the issues of the moral responsibility for manipulation 
and its political applications, my main focus is on the mechanism of manipulation. In my 
thesis I argue (1) that Kant’s pragmatical anthropology and empirical psychology can 
provide us with an explanation why people are susceptible to manipulation; and (2) that 
Kant’s maxims of common understanding can help us partially protect ourselves from the 
deteriorating effects of manipulation by establishing personal autonomy. 
My thesis heavily relies on the contemporary discussions on the empirical 
dimension of Kant's moral philosophy. I owe much to Wood (1999; 2007), Louden (2000; 
2011), Frierson (2005; 2014), who did a great job to show that Kant should not be regarded 
as psychologically naïve. I will show that a framework of Kant’s empirical psychology is 
robust enough to explain how manipulation works and why it is so efficient. I believe that 
a Kantian theory of manipulation is relevant for contemporary discussions about 
manipulation because it has good explanatory power and provides us with an unorthodox 
perspective on a manipulatee. It considers a manipulatee as prudentially and morally 
responsible for being vulnerable in the face of manipulation. What should be stressed is 
that this kind of responsibility does not justify manipulation in any sense. Instead, a 
Kantian theory of manipulation underlines that every person can (and ought to) contribute 
to her own security from manipulation. 
This leads us to my second claim. One must strive for personal autonomy in order 
to protect oneself from the deteriorating effects of manipulation. While there are other 
attempts on building a Kantian conception of personal autonomy (see Taylor, 2005; or 
Formoza, 2013), I do it in a quite different manner. I argue that from a Kantian perspective 
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personal autonomy can be established through adoption of Kant’s three maxims of 
common understanding. I also argue that these three maxims are in fact three different 
formulations of one and the same maxim. Adopting it involves a very sophisticated thought 
experiment which helps us partially to protect ourselves from the deteriorating effects of 
manipulation. 
In the first chapter I will show how empirical psychology fits into the Kantian 
framework. In the second chapter, I will present some parts of Kant’s account of empirical 
psychology. I will focus on the empirical mechanisms of human action and cognition and 
defects in cognition and volition. In the third chapter, I will present a brief account of 
Kant’s natural teleology to show how the nature, in a sense, manipulates human beings into 
developing the culture, making sociability and progress possible. In the fourth chapter, I 
will show that the very same features of human nature that, according to Kant, make 
sociability and progress possible are responsible for our susceptibility to manipulation. I 
will also discuss here particular manipulative techniques and the ways in which they 
exploit defects in cognition and volition. In the fifth chapter, I will look into how Kant 
understands relations between autonomy and enlightenment in order to understand whether 
Kant’s idea of autonomy can contribute somehow to our defense against manipulation. I 
will also touch upon the issue of moral responsibility for manipulation. Finally, in the sixth 
chapter I will show how exactly we can we use the maxims of common understanding to 
protect ourselves from manipulation. 
 
1 On the possibility of a Kantian empirical psychology 
 
In this chapter I am going to look into whether there is a possibility for empirical 
psychology as a science within a Kantian framework. I will start by explaining why this 
inquiry is important for this thesis. 
I define manipulation as a deliberate action that aims to change the behavior or 
beliefs through conscious lying or conscious usage of techniques that preclude or hinder a 
moral deliberation. This concept of manipulation presumes that a manipulator uses his 
techniques consciously. For that reason I regard a manipulator as a person who has set 
certain ends and uses manipulative techniques in order to achieve them. 
The manipulative techniques should be efficient enough; otherwise there is no point 
in engaging into them. The efficiency of the manipulative techniques implies that there 
should be some cause-and-effect relations involved. The manipulator should have 
knowledge of these relations, if he wants to be successful. What kind of relations can it be? 
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The end of the manipulator is to change beliefs and/or desires of a manipulatee, hence he 
needs the knowledge about cause-and-effect relations behind the behavior and mind of 
human beings, which is basically a subject of empirical psychology. It is not necessary for 
the manipulator to have a highly systemized and refined knowledge about these relations; 
it suffices if he is just aware that, say, this particular manipulative technique may influence 
people in that particular way. In other words, he needs knowledge-that, rather than 
knowledge-how. Still, if empirical psychology as a system of knowledge is not possible 
within a Kantian framework, then the Kantian framework is not suited for the explaining of 
how manipulation works and what one can do to defend oneself from it. 
The problem is that Kant’s attitude towards the empirical psychology is not 
unequivocal. In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science he puts it rather bluntly that 
“[t]he empirical doctrine of the soul can … never become … a science of the soul, nor 
even a psychological experimental doctrine” (Kant, 4:471)1. This claim seems to be 
consistent with the importance that Kant puts on freedom as an uncaused cause and 
absolute spontaneity in his moral philosophy. According to Kant, the moral worth of a 
good action is derivative; it is derived from the fact that the will behind this action is good 
(see Kant, 4:393-394). The will is good only when it is fully determined by the moral law 
rather than by instincts or inclinations. Any trace of natural causation within the human 
action may compromise its moral worth. If I am doing something which seems morally 
good not out of respect for the moral law, but just because I have a psychological 
inclination towards this kind of behavior, then my action lacks moral worth2. What makes 
a person essentially free is that she is the legislator of the moral law. She “is subject only to 
laws given by herself” (Kant, 4:332). Since for Kant, ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’ (cf. Kant, 
3:A548/B576), this picture of moral freedom supposedly implies that a moral agent can 
exempt herself from the causal effects of her inclinations, desires, instincts when they are 
incompatible with the demands of the moral law. Moreover, even when they are in 
compliance with the moral law, they cannot be a decisive causal power behind the morally 
good action. Henry E. Allison successfully captures the implications of Kant’s 
transcendental freedom in his ‘incorporation thesis’: “the intentional actions of a rational 
agent are never ‘merely’ the causal consequences of … any … antecedent conditions”, 
they necessarily require “an act of spontaneity” (Allison, 1990, 5). In other words, desires 
                                               
1 Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason are located by reference to the pagination of Kant’s first ‘A’ 
and/or second ‘B’ editions. All other passages from Kant’s works are cited by the volume and page number, 
given by Arabic numerals separated by a colon, in the Academy edition of Kant’s writings. 
2 However, it does not follow from this that I cannot simultaneously have such an inclination and still be 
determined by the respect for the moral law. 
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(as empirical mental states) can determine a rational agent’s will only if she allows them to 
do so3. 
From this perspective it is hard to understand the place of empirical psychology 
within a Kantian framework. It may seem that Kant’s understanding of freedom is akin to 
Sartre’s one, in that “there is no human nature” (Sartre, 1956, 290). Or even if there is 
human nature, it is not that important to understand or study it, because a rational agent is 
able to override all its effects. However, it is definitely not Kant’s position, because he 
believes both that there is human nature and that its study is incredibly important. But why 
is it important? First of all, because human beings are not perfectly rational. There are “the 
subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in the carrying out 
of the laws of a metaphysics of morals” (Kant, 6:217). Hence, it is crucial to understand 
these conditions for the realization of morality by human beings. Kant clearly 
acknowledges that ethics should have the rational part and the empirical part. He calls the 
latter practical anthropology (see Kant, 4:388) or moral anthropology (Kant, 6:217); the 
main function of it is “to gain for [moral laws] access to the human will” (Kant, 4:389). 
Moral anthropology, however, should not be confused with what Kant calls anthropology 
from a pragmatic point of view4. The subject of pragmatic anthropology is wider than that 
of moral anthropology. It is not limited to the purely moral matters, but concerns also the 
technical and prudential applications of the anthropological knowledge (see Wood, 1999, 
203-205). 
While pragmatic anthropology and empirical psychology are not the same thing5, 
the former presupposes the possibility of the latter. I am not going to elaborate on this 
much, but what is important is that empirical psychology is a purely theoretical enterprise, 
while pragmatic anthropology is, in a sense, an applied discipline regarding a human being 
as capable of goal-setting. Pragmatic anthropology involves “the investigation of what [a 
human] as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” (Kant, 
7:119). Kant also states that pragmatic anthropology teaches us how “to use other human 
beings skillfully for one’s purposes” (Kant, 7:322).  
There are a few other features of pragmatic anthropology we need to mention. First, 
Kant regards pragmatic anthropology as a popular discipline. In other words, it is not only 
for the members of academia, but for a broad audience. Its aim is to promote 
                                               
3 Some commentators even ascribe to Kant a view that it is impossible to explain the intentional actions in 
empirical terms. For a further discussion of these positions see Frierson, 2014, 10-14; Louden, 2000, 17-8; 
Cohen, 2009, 31-32; Wood, 1999, 178-180. 
4 In the following I will refer to it as ‘pragmatic anthropology’. 
5 For a discussion of relations between anthropology and psychology in Kant see Wood, 1999, 197-198; 
Louden, 2011, 79; Frierson, 2014, 43-49. 
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“enlightenment for common life” (Kant, 25:853). Second, it is the general knowledge of 
the world (Weltkenntniß), i.e. it concerns “the nature of humanity, not the state of human 
beings, for the particular properties of human beings always change, but the nature of 
humanity does not” (Kant, 25:471). However, in spite of this, pragmatic anthropology has 
sections focused on the character of the sexes and the different nations. 
As Robert Louden stresses, “pragmatic anthropology can be put to many different 
purposes, some of which are blatantly immoral”, for example, “shrewd politicians may 
exploit their knowledge of human nature to advance their own personal agendas for power 
and control” (Louden, 2011, 69). It seems that pragmatic anthropology can explain how a 
manipulator succeeds in using other humans for his ends. But there is still an open question 
how is that kind of knowledge is consistent with other parts of Kant’s philosophical 
system. It is being debated vehemently, and I am not intending to contribute to this debate 
in this chapter, as it is beyond the scope of this project. In the following I am rather going 
to briefly sketch one possible way of reconciling Kant’s empirical psychology with the 
transcendental freedom. There are two perspectives on the human action: 
 
a rational being has … two standpoints, from which it can consider itself and cognize the laws for 
the use of its powers, consequently all its actions: first, insofar as it belongs to the world of sense, 
under natural laws (heteronomy), and second, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws 
which are independent of nature, not empirical, but rather grounded merely in reason. (Kant, 4:452). 
 
The second perspective is practical. According to it every rational agent is 
essentially free; it “is the proper standpoint for moral philosophy” (Frierson, 2014, 14). 
According to the first perspective, every human action is a part of the empirical world, i.e. 
it is a phenomenon; and as any other phenomenon it is determined by the causal laws. 
However, there is a fundamental incompleteness in any causal explanation. “For any causal 
law of human thought or action, one can always ask why that law has the structure that it 
does”. While “[t]his possibility does not imply that these causal laws are any less natural, 
nor any less predictive” (Frierson, 2014, 15), it leaves some place for transcendental 
freedom, hence empirical psychology is not necessary inconsistent within a Kantian 
framework. I do not need to argue for a stronger claim here. 
There is also another reason why Kant states that a genuine “science of the soul” is 
not possible. It is related to Kant’s understanding of the term ‘science’. To put it simply, 
his problem with psychology is that it lacks a priori basis and cannot be the source of 
apodictic truths. In other words, even if there are noticeable regularities, we cannot 
describe them in the absolutely universal terms as they are essentially contingent. Still, 
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Kant allows that psychology is possible as a “historical systematic natural doctrine of the 
inner sense” (Kant, 4:471), which is good enough for my goals in this project. A 
manipulative technique should not have a guaranteed effect in order to be effective. 
 
2 A brief account of Kant’s empirical psychology 
 
In this chapter I will present some parts of Kant’s empirical psychology, namely I 
will focus on the empirical accounts of human action and cognition and defects of 
cognition and volition. This will help to explain the mechanism of manipulation6. I will 
here substantially rely on Frierson’s systematic reconstruction of Kant’s empirical 
psychology (see Frierson, 2005; Frierson, 2014). 
 
2.1 Human action 
 
As I have said in the previous chapter, a manipulator should have some knowledge 
of cause-and-effect relations behind the behavior of human beings if she wants to be 
successful in achieving her ends. The possibility of manipulation can be explained only by 
tracing the series of causes and effects. And it brings us to Kant’s account of human action. 
Frierson sums this account up thus: “cognition of an object gives rise (sometimes) to a 
feeling of pleasure or pain, and that feeling gives rise (again, sometimes) to a desire or 
aversion for the object” (Frierson, 2014, 56). Hence, the most basic model of action looks 
this way: 
 
(i)  Cognition → Feeling → Desire → Action 
        ↑ 
     Motivation power7 
(Instinct; or Inclination; 
        or Character) 
 
Cognition, feeling and desire correspond to the three faculties of the mind (see 
Kant, 5:198). In addition to this threefold distinction Kant distinguishes between higher 
and lower faculties. The lower faculties are passive and receptive, while the higher 
                                               
6 I will present it in the fourth chapter. 
7 Motivational power is the mechanism which carries out the transition from ‘cognition’ to ‘feeling/desire’. 
Technically, it belongs to faculty of desire; i.e. inclinations and instincts are motivational powers of the lower 
faculty of desire, while character is a motivational power of the higher faculty of desire. 
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faculties have relative spontaneity. I use the word ‘relative’ in order to distinguish it from 
the absolute spontaneity of the transcendental freedom. To make things clearer we can 
relate it to what Kant calls “a comparative concept of freedom”; according to it “something 
is called free action if its determining natural basis lies in the acting being internally” 
(Kant, 5:96). The higher faculties are determined by their internal organization, which 
gives a human being a sense of psychological freedom8 when he is using them. 
Kant refers to the lower faculty of cognition as sensibility; it includes the senses 
and imagination. The higher faculty of cognition is called understanding (in a broad sense); 
it includes three cognitive powers: the understanding in a narrower sense, reason and the 
power of judgment (see Kant, 7:196). Kant makes a similar distinction between lower and 
higher faculties of feeling and desire. But their explanation is derivative. If one has a 
purely sensible cognition, then it may give a rise to a sensible feeling of pleasure (or 
displeasure) and, then, to a sensitive desire. However, if the initial cognition involves the 
understanding in a broad sense, then the resulting desire will fall under the higher faculty 
of desire; i.e., in Kantian terms, it will be intellectual. The content of the desire is irrelevant 
for this classification; what matters is whether the higher faculty of cognition is involved in 
giving rise to this desire or not. 
I will omit the discussion of the transition to an ‘action’ phase, because having a 
desire necessarily leads to the agent’s attempt to change the world somehow. If it does not 
lead to this, then it, according to Kant’s terminology, is merely a wish. For example, if 
John has two conflicting desires, and one of these desires is stronger and, as result, John is 
moved by it, then we should classify his unrealized desire not as a real desire, but as a 
wish. In other words, a desire – as Kant defines it – always has practical consequences; it 
always leads to some action. 
I am also not going to pay too much attention to the ‘feeling’ phase and the 
transition from it to the ‘desire’ phase. There are two kinds of feelings of pleasure (or 
displeasure): aesthetic and practical. The pure aesthetic pleasure never gives rise to a 
desire; whereas the practical pleasure “is the direct cause of desire” (Frierson, 2014, 59). 
The connection between the practical feeling and desire usually does not need any 
additional investigation. Affects are the only exception, but I will consider them later. 
What is of interest to me here now is how the transition from cognition to pleasure/desire 
works: 
                                               
8 It means that an agent feels that he was not coerced into doing what he has done, that he could have done 
otherwise. 
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a) In case of the lower faculty of cognition, this transition is explained by appeal to 
either instincts or inclinations. Instincts are natural predispositions. They do not have a 
further causal explanation9; they are innate, and living beings (including humans) just have 
them. Here is the example of how an instinct explains transition from the cognition to the 
desire: 
 
(ii) 10 Sweet smell of a ripe mango → Desire for that mango 
↑ 
      Instinct for sweet foods 
  
In this example a sensory cognition of a mango gives the rise to the desire for the 
mango, and this connection between cognition and desire is explained by the innate instinct 
for sweet foods. 
 Unlike instincts, inclinations are not natural, but acquired (see Frierson, 2014, 69). 
They presume some natural predispositions. Any acquired addiction gives us a good 
example of how the inclination develops. 
 
 (iii)          Sight of cigarettes advertisement → Desire to smoke 
                      ↑ 
Previous experience of smoking cigarettes → Inclination to smoking cigarettes 
                ↑ 
        Propensity to the nicotine consumption 
 
 The inclination to smoking is not innate. In order to develop it, a person must have 
the past experience of smoking. But in order to explain why this experience may lead to 
developing an inclination we need additional causal explanation – propensity. “Propensity 
… is the inner possibility of an inclination, i.e. the natural predisposition to the inclination” 
(Kant, 25:1111-1112). There is no need for further explanation, because propensities are 
natural and innate, just as instincts. 
 b) In case of the higher faculty of cognition, cognitions that may give rise to desire 
are practical principles or maxims11. The transition from a maxim to pleasure/desire is 
explained by appeal to character. While many living beings have instincts and inclinations, 
                                               
9 But they can be explained teleologically. However, it is not relevant to the goals of this chapter; hence I am 
not going to elaborate on teleological explanation here. 
10 The diagram is taken from Friesron, 2014, 68. 
11 A maxim here should be understood as any principle that governs action. It should not be necessary a 
moral principle. A moral principle is a specific maxim which can be universalized. 
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only rational beings have character. It should be noted that Kant uses the term ‘character’ 
for the different purposes. Sometimes he uses it to refer to the intelligible character of a 
person as noumenon. In that case the character “is not itself appearance” (Kant, 
3:A539/B567) and, hence cannot be appealed to in empirical explanation. In this chapter, 
however, I am talking about what Kant calls ‘character simply’ and defines as “that 
property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles” 
(Kant, 7:292)12. In other words, whether cognizing this particular maxim gives a rise to a 
desire or not depends on one’s character. ‘Cognizing’ in this case does not necessarily 
mean ‘judging that’. A person can entertain a certain principle without attributing any 
value to it. This entertaining should not necessary be very explicit. When someone is in the 
certain circumstances, he considers very quickly a lot of different maxims which can be 
applied to this particular situation, i.e. he cognizes these maxims. 
 For example: David has overslept and got up later than he had planned, and now he 
risks missing a meeting. If David thinks about the principle ‘always be in time for 
meetings’ and he has a commitment to it in his character, then it must have some influence 
on his actions. Perhaps, he would decide to miss his breakfast in order to immediately get a 
taxi. But if David does not have a commitment to this principle, he may think something 
like: “Well, some people may believe that it is important to always be in time for meetings; 
but I think that being late is not that bad”. In that case he entertains the relevant maxim, but 
there is no a commitment to it in his character, hence it does not give rise to a desire. 
 Character is akin to inclinations in that it is not a natural disposition, but acquired 
(see Kant 7:294). As with inclinations, there is a propensity to character which is innate 
and natural. Kant also states that other factors may contribute to developing of character. 
For example, different temperaments13 have an influence on it (see Kant, 25:1388). But 
what is more relevant for this thesis is that “[t]he acquisition of good character with people 
happens through education” (Kant, 25:1172) and its development is influenced by “various 
social institutions … including stable and just political regimes, peace, and even progress 
in the arts and sciences” (Frierson, 2014, 79). According to Kant, a person herself “through 
understanding and reason” (Kant, 25:1172) can also cultivate her character. 
 It can be summed up thus: 
 
                                               
12 For a brief account of different Kant’s uses of the term ‘character’ see Frierson, 2014, 73. 
13 Temperament for Kant is also a natural predisposition and does not need any further causal explanation. 
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(iv)             Cognizing the principle        Desire to do 
       ‘always be in time for meetings’ → something about it 
           ↑ 
Education; stable polite society;           Commitment to the principle 
 cultivating character in oneself   →  ‘always be in time for meetings’ 
       ↑ 
Propensity to character 
    (and temperament) 
 
 As we can see, according to Kant, the practical principles are crucial part of rational 
action. The investigation into the mechanism of their formation will be my goal in the next 
sub-section. 
 
2.2 Human cognition 
 
The human beings have higher and lower variations of the faculty of cognition. The 
lower faculty of cognition is sensibility; it includes the senses and imagination. The higher 
faculty of cognition is called understanding (in a broad sense); it includes three cognitive 
powers: the understanding in a narrower sense, reason and the power of judgment (see 
Kant, 7:196). I am not going to present here Kant’s empirical account of the senses, 
because it is not that relevant for my thesis14. Imagination, on the other hand, plays a very 
important role in producing prejudices and causing enthusiasm. Both prejudices and 
enthusiasm (as an affect) are used by a manipulator in order to bypass a manipulatee’s 
rational deliberation. 
a) Imagination is a “faculty of intuition without the presence of the object” (Kant, 
7:167) It can be productive or reproductive. If I remember something that I have 
experienced before, I use reproductive imagination (which is, basically, memory). But 
when I construct something new in my imagination, then I use its productive form. 
However, even productive imagination “is not capable of producing a sense representation 
that was never given to our faculty of sense; one can always furnish evidence of the 
material of its ideas” (Kant, 7:168). In other words, it combines cognitions or simple 
components of cognitions we have already experienced into new ones. It can create 
connections between our cognitions. The way Kant treats imagination strongly resembles 
Hume’s account of imagination (see Hume, 1978, 283). Kant posits the law of association, 
                                               
14 For Kant’s empirical account of the senses see Frierson, 2014, 94-96. 
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according to it “empirical ideas that have frequently followed one  another  produce  a  
habit  in  the  mind  such  that  when  one  idea  is produced,  the  other  also  comes  into  
being” (Kant, 7:176). “Association is based on three elements, on accompaniment, 
contiguity, and on relation” (Kant, 25: 512). Here is the basic model: 
 
(v) 15         Cognition x → Cognition y 
           ↑ 
Frequent experience of cognition y        Mental habit 
      associated with cognition x       →   of association 
                  ↑ 
        Imagination 
 
 This function of imagination is incredibly important; it explains, among other 
things, the connection between any word and corresponding concept. However, as I will 
show later, imagination may also lead to the development of unsound provisional 
principles, or prejudices. 
 b) The higher faculty of cognition is divided into three cognitive powers: the 
understanding, reason and the power of judgment. Each of these powers has its own 
principles governing transition from one cognition (or a set of cognitions) to another. The 
understanding carries out a transition from a set of sensory cognitions to the concept. This 
process involves three stages: comparison, reflection, and abstraction (see Kant, 9:95). E.g. 
I see a lot of different animals, compare them, reflect on what is common between them, 
and abstract from it everything else, as result, thus I form a concept of an animal in 
general. 
 All three powers govern transitions between judgments, and each power has its own 
principles. These principles are called provisional; they are “maxims for the investigation 
of a thing” (Kant, 9:75). The principles of reason are basic syllogistic forms, such as 
modus ponens and modus tollens (see Kant, 9:130). The principles of the power of 
judgment are analogy (an inference from particular to total similarity of two things) and 
induction (an inference from the particular to the universal in regard to many objects) (see 
Kant, 9:133)16. And the principle of understanding is an ‘immediate inference’ from the 
universal to the particular. For example: 
 
                                               
15 The diagram is taken from Friesron, 2014, 98. 
16 It should be noted, that the principles of the power of judgment cannot produce infallible knowledge. 
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(vi)         Thought that ‘all animals        Thought that ‘some animals 
that have heart also have kidneys’ → that have heart also have kidneys’ 
                  ↑ 
   An immediate inference 
         of understanding 
 
 It was an account of a how the higher faculty of cognition ought to work. But, in 
practice, it is often influenced by sensibility and, thus tends to carry out the transitions 
between judgments on the basis of unsound provisional principles, or prejudices. In the 
next sub-section I will consider the defects of cognition and volition and briefly discuss 
their sources. 
 
 2.3 Defects of cognition and volition 
  
 In this sub-section I am not going to discuss all possible defects of cognition and 
volition. I will focus on those which can be exploited by a manipulator. More specifically, 
I will consider prejudices, affects and passion. 
a) In addition to prejudices there are other cognitive defects, such as mental and 
cognitive disorders. But I believe it is safe to say that such defects are exceptional cases17, 
while prejudices are common and widespread. Kant defines a prejudice as “a principium 
for judging, not from objective grounds, but … [from] subjective ones” (Kant, 24:864). 
First of all, it must be stressed that Kant does not regard the prejudice as a merely false 
judgment. For him the prejudice is a provisional principle akin to those of understanding, 
reason and the power of judgment. However, unlike them, the prejudice is an unsound 
principle; of course, it may lead to the right judgment, but it can never justify it (see Kant, 
9:75-76). I will give few examples of prejudices to make things clearer: 
 A logical egoism is an unsound principle, according to which your judgment 
is better than judgments of others just on the ground of being yours.  
 The prejudice of the prestige of the multitude (the multitude prejudice) is an 
unsound principle, according to which the judgment shared by majority is 
better than the judgment shared by minority. 
 The prejudice of the prestige of the person (the person prejudice) is an 
unsound principle, according to which the judgment of a certain person is 
                                               
17 Surely a manipulator can exploit these exceptional cognitive defects too for his purposes. However, in this 
thesis I am more interested in why relatively mentally healthy people are susceptible to manipulation. 
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better than judgments of others just on the ground of being a judgment of 
that particular person.  
These prejudices are highly efficient for manipulation. If a manipulator succeeds in 
convincing a manipulatee that some judgment is shared by majority or comes from a well-
respected expert, and if the manipulatee adopts the prejudices not only as a provisional 
judgments, but also as provisional principles18, then it would lead to the manipulatee’s 
acceptance of the judgment imposed by the manipulator. 
I want to say few additional things about the person prejudice. It seems perfectly 
rational to value the judgments of a certain person higher than the judgments of others, if 
this person is considered to be more competent, i.e. if she is a well-known expert. There 
are different ways how we can understand why Kant calls it a prejudice. First, it can be 
understood that we should not trust experts in all things, especially in those, which are 
outside of their area of expertise. For example, the fact that Chris is a well-known expert in 
quantum physics does not make him a competent specialist in linguistics. Hence, it would 
be epistemically wrong to appeal to Chris’s reputation of being a great scientist, when the 
matter of discussion is beyond his competence. Second, it can be understood that there are 
certain fields of knowledge where one’s prestige cannot justify anything. Morality is a 
good example. All moral truths are a priori, and they are equally accessible for all rational 
beings. Hence, from a Kantian perspective, there is no such thing as a genuine expert in 
morality. Third, we may understand it conditionally. The fact that some claim was made by 
an expert should not be taken as a sufficient justification for validity of this claim, because 
(1) the expert can be fake19; and (2) even if he is a real expert, he may lie to us. If we are 
absolutely sure that (1) and (2) are false, than it would be rational to believe the expert. 
The problem is that both (1) and (2) are very difficult to rule out. Furthermore, a critical 
attitude towards experts is also a matter of self-respect. In ‘Answering the Question: What 
is Enlightenment?’ Kant compares a thoughtless trust in experts (guardians) with 
immaturity: 
 
It is so comfortable to be immature. If I have a book that reasons for me, a pastor who acts as my 
conscience, a physician who determines my diet for me, etc., then I need not make any effort myself. 
It is not necessary that I think if I can just pay; others will take such irksome business upon 
themselves for me. The guardians who have kindly assumed supervisory responsibility have ensured 
                                               
18 The difference is that a prejudice may lead to the right judgment. Hence, provisional judgments may have 
some provisional or heuristic merit. However, it would be wrong to think that the rightness of the judgment 
follows from the prejudice. In other words, the prejudice cannot justify the right judgment. One may use 
provisional judgments without adopting them as principles. In that case, he is less vulnerable to 
manipulation, because he does not regard new cognitions as a real knowledge (i.e. based on objective 
grounds), but rather as an opinion or hypothesis (i.e. based on subjective grounds). 
19 I will elaborate more on how the multitude prejudice may lead to the person prejudice in the fourth chapter.  
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that the largest part of humanity (including the entirety of the fairer sex) understands progress 
toward maturity to be not only arduous, but also dangerous (Kant, 8:35). 
 
I believe that all three interpretations of the person prejudice are compatible with 
Kant’s writings. Moreover, they are, actually, also compatible with each other. It is 
epistemically wrong to rely on an expert in the matters which are beyond his expertise; it is 
epistemically wrong to rely on the expert in the matters where all rational beings are, 
basically, epistemic peers (e.g. in the matters of morality); it is reasonable to take into 
account that an expert can be fake or deceitful.  
Kant lists three sources of prejudices: imitation, custom and inclination. Imitation 
causes one to hold “to be true what others have put forth as true” (Kant, 9:76). All these 
sources belong to the lower cognitive faculty, either the senses or imagination: 
 
all errors rest on the fact that sensibility influences the understanding. When one believes that one 
has this [cognition] through understanding, and sensibility has a secret influence in the matter, then 
errors arise (Kant, 24:863). 
 
The sources of prejudices are interconnected. People have an inclination to laziness; 
they want to be successful and respected without doing too much. Imitation of others and 
observance of received customs is the most straightforward way of achieving this. A long-
lasting imitation in turn may lead to the creation of new custom. An imitation and customs 
are formed through the law of association, which I have discussed earlier. 
 
(vii) 20  Prior experience  →  Prejudice      
     ↑ 
             Imagination (i.e. imitation or custom) 
    and/or inclination 
 
The prejudices are very efficient as means of transition from one cognition to 
another. They help to make judgments very fast and with low costs. And not so seldom, the 
judgments based on prejudices turn out to be correct. Kant holds that people have an 
inclination to laziness, which greatly contributes to the development, and their acceptance, 
of prejudices. It is much easier to imitate other people, or live according to traditions, than 
to think for oneself. Hence, the best way to fight prejudices is to use one’s own 
understanding, use only rational provisional principles and double-check any judgment that 
does not originate from these principles. 
                                               
20 The diagram is taken from Frierson, 2014, 197. 
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b) Affects and passions are similar to prejudices in that they also bypass rational 
deliberation. Kant refers to them as “illness[es] of the mind, because both affect and 
passion shut out the sovereignty of  reason” (Kant, 7:252). Kant defines an affect as the 
disorder of the faculty of feeling; but he also uses the word ‘affect’ to refer to a particular 
feeling which leads to this disorder. As a feeling it does not involve any perspective in the 
future, it is here and now. A person does not deliberate on what she is going to do or how 
she is going to do it; an affect almost immediately leads to some action or inactivity.  
For example: Josef says something incredibly offensive to Ceferino. Ceferino 
immediately punches Josef in the face. Ceferino does not have a commitment to a practical 
principle ‘always punch those who say something offensive to you’. Moreover, Ceferino is 
a pacifist; he has a commitment to the principle ‘never hurt physically anyone’. But an 
affect made him unable to behave in accordance with his principles. Perhaps, few minutes 
later Ceferino even would ask Josef for forgiveness for being excessively violent. 
Kant stresses that “it is not the intensity of a certain feeling that constitutes the 
affected state, but the lack of reflection in comparing this feeling with the sum of all 
feelings (of pleasure or displeasure)” (Kant, 7:254). Other feelings and corresponding 
desires just end up not being taken into account. Ceferino was so overwhelmed by the 
painful feeling of anger that he was not even able to think about his principles. 
c) Passions are similar to affects in that they preclude rational deliberation. 
However, passions allow at least some reflection. For Kant, a passion is the disorder of the 
faculty of desire, but he also uses the word ‘passion’ to refer to a particular desire which is 
constitutive of this disorder. Frierson argues that we should understand ‘passion’ as a 
“practical principle that has sensuously given ends” (Frierson, 2014, 228-230) and that 
precludes any comparing of it with the sum of all desires in respect to a certain choice. 
For example: Mani has said something incredibly offensive to Luke. Luke has not 
showed any reaction to this, but he has decided to revenge Mani in the future. Basically, he 
has adopted a principle ‘revenge is a dish best served cold’. In the future, Luke can be very 
inventive in following this maxim; he can deliberate a lot on the sub-ordinate maxims in 
order to invent the most ingenious way of revenge. “Passion always presupposes a maxim 
on the part of the subject, to act according to an end prescribed to him by his inclination” 
(Kant, 7:266). Hence, his rational deliberation is not fully precluded. However, if it is a 
real passion, then Luke would find it extremely hard to drop it, as he is unable to compare 
it with other desires. Basically, his passion precludes refection on happiness or morals. A 
passionate person also tends to rationalize his passion. For instance, Luke may convince 
himself that his mania for vengeance, actually, is not a passion, but a moral duty. 
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According to Kant, this rationalization is primarily intended to repress one’s sense of guilt; 
Kant calls it self-deception. Self-deception is a particular example of the secret influence of 
sensibility on the higher faculty of cognition. 
Affects and passions interfere with normal processes of rational choice. They can 
be exploited by a manipulator. The manipulator can – by provoking an affective or 
passionate state21 in a manipulatee – trick him into doing something that is somehow 
advantageous for the manipulator. Affects corrupt the faculty of feeling, compromising 
possibility of choice; and passions corrupt the faculty of desire or choice itself. 
I will say few words on how one can cope with affects and passions. The 
susceptibility to affects shows a lack of virtue22. If one is already in the affective state, then 
there is little she can do. However, it is possible to prepare oneself for the future 
encounters with affects by cultivating virtue of self-mastery that Kant also calls courage. 
The same can be sad about passions; one should cultivate self-mastery to be prepared. But 
there is also another thing which makes passions extremely difficult to deal with. Unlike 
affects, many passions are the product of the social development. People acquire them 
when they begin to compare themselves with others. It gives a rise to such passions as 
envy, ingratitude, spite (Kant, 6:27), manias for honor, power, and wealth (Kant, 7:268). 
Passions, at least partially, are a social problem, and they can be pacified by the further 
socio-cultural development. 
What unites prejudices, affects and passions is that all of them involve a secret 
influence of sensibility on the higher faculty of cognition and, as result, an inability to 
think for oneself. As I will argue in the other chapters, ‘think for oneself’, for Kant, is not 
merely an epistemological principle, but also a demand of the moral law, and all defects of 
cognition and volition are, in fact, consequences of what Kant calls radical evil of human 
nature. 
 
 3. Nature as an original manipulator 
 
In the previous chapter I have presented some parts of Kant’s account empirical 
psychology which are necessary for the causal explanation of the mechanism of 
manipulation. In this chapter, I am going to examine human susceptibility to manipulation 
from another standpoint. I will start this chapter by presenting a brief account of Kant’s 
                                               
21 It can be done, for instance, by exposing a manipulatee to images of gruesome murder scenes or war 
crimes. 
22 Virtues are inclinations which help people in carrying out the demands of the moral law. They must be 
consciously cultivated. According to Kant, it is a wide duty of every human being.  
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natural teleology. Then I will show that from a teleological point of view (i.e. if we assume 
that nature has its own ends23) nature itself can be regarded as a manipulator, because it 
tricks human beings into developing culture. 
This teleological account is helpful for two reasons. First, it shows that the very 
same features of human nature that, according to Kant, make socio-cultural progress 
possible are also responsible for human susceptibility to manipulation. In a sense, a 
manipulator just imitates nature. Second, this account shows that the manipulative 
techniques are essentially woven into the very fabric of society. It explains why they are 
not just mechanically possible24, but also wide-spread and efficient. 
 
3.1 Kant’s natural teleology 
 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant says that some objects or actions can 
be understood and explained only if it is assumed that there is a will with the certain ends 
and principles behind those objects or actions. In Kantian terms, these objects or actions 
are called purposive. 
 
An object or a state of mind or even an action, however, even if its possibility does not necessarily 
presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely because its possibility can only 
be explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with 
ends, i.e., a will that has arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain rule (Kant, 
5:220, 105). 
 
To put it simply, something is purposive when it appears as if designed or produced 
according to the idea of some purpose. Kant distinguishes between two kinds of 
purposiveness: 
1) A subjectively purposive action or object appears “as if designed for the sake of 
our cognitive capacities”25. 
                                               
23 It should be stressed that Kant does not make an ontological claim that nature has its own ends. He states it 
very clearly that “we do not actually observe ends in nature as intentional, but merely add this concept as a 
guideline for the power of judgment in reflection on the products of nature” (Kant, 5:399). 
24 The mechanical possibility of manipulation is explained in the second chapter. 
25 Subjective purposiveness can be of two subkinds - logical and aesthetic. Logical purposiveness is 
displayed by the activity of the cognitive faculties in the perception of nature as a whole. According to Kant, 
we tend to – and, actually, ought to – regard nature “as doing us an epistemological favor by making possible 
both its taxonomical ordering in terms of a coherent set of concepts and its nomological ordering in terms of 
a set of empirical laws that allow for the construction of overarching theories” (Allison, 2009, 30). Aesthetic 
purposiveness is displayed by the activity of the cognitive faculties in the perception of the beautiful. The 
pure judgments of beauty involve a free play of imagination and understanding, this free play cause us regard 
beautiful objects as formally purposive. While it is a very interesting topic which is not fully irrelevant to the 
problem of manipulation, I will not elaborate further on aesthetic purposiveness here, because it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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2) An objectively purposive action or object appears “as if designed with respect to 
[its] own inner possibility” (Alisson, 2009, 29). In the following I will focus exclusively on 
objective purposiveness. 
Objective purposiveness is the principle of teleological judgment, i.e. when one 
judges something teleologically, he hypothetically presupposes that it serves some purpose. 
This purpose can be either internal or relative. For example, according to Kant, every 
organic being should be considered as a natural end, i.e. as internally purposive, because 
functions of its parts can be explained only in relation to the whole. Hence, the idea of the 
whole organism conceptually predates its own parts (see Kant, 5:376). While the notion of 
a natural end is a very important for Kant’s philosophy of biology, I am more interested 
here in another form of objective purposiveness – a relative one. Kant makes a rather 
strong claim that assuming internal purposiveness of organisms “necessarily leads to the 
idea of the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rule of ends” (Kant, 
5:379)26. In other words, we should (or, at least, may) regard nature teleologically, i.e. as a 
complex hierarchical system where one object is relatively purposive to another. And the 
word ‘nature’ here should be understood in a very broad way: everything determined by 
causal mechanical laws is a part of nature. 
Kant argues that if we consider nature this way, we shall see that everything exists 
for the sake of humankind (see Kant, 5:427). What makes a human being unique is that “he 
is the only being on earth who forms a concept of ends for himself and who by means of 
his reason can make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things” 
(Kant, 5:427). Kant also assumes that there should be a final end of creation, which is 
something absolutely unconditioned, something that is good for its own sake (see Kant, 
5:426). There are two candidates for the final end: morality and happiness. Wood interprets 
Kant’s notion of the final end “as having two components related … conditionally” (Wood, 
1999, 312), i.e. morality and happiness proportional to morality. Morality from a Kantian 
perspective presupposes transcendental freedom, i.e. such a will that is not fully 
determined by causal mechanical laws. In other words, morality cannot be a product of 
nature. Hence, the final end has to be outside of nature, it can be set only by a free rational 
being as noumenon. The role of nature, i.e. its ultimate end27 is to prepare a rational being 
for exercising freedom of choice. It can be done through bringing culture. Kant 
distinguishes between two forms of culture: the culture of discipline which Kant defines as 
                                               
26 However, literally on the next page Kant makes a much weaker claim that “we may go further” (Kant, 
5:380) (bold emphasis mine). I tend to agree with Allison who thinks that the reference to necessity should be 
ignored (see Allison, 2009, 36). 
27 The ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation should not be confused! 
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negative and consisting in “the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires” and the 
culture of skill which is understood as “[t]he production of the aptitude of a rational being 
for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom)” (Kant, 5:431-432). It is the second 
form of culture which is especially crucial for transition from nature to freedom. 
To sum it up: the ultimate end of nature considered as a teleological system is to 
make humankind cultured (in a very specific sense). By doing this nature prepares humans 
for exercising freedom of choice. Then humans may set up a final end which is morality 
and strive towards it. I want to stress two things here. First, Kant does not claim that nature 
is a system of purposes which has an ultimate end. Objective purposiveness is only “a 
principle for guiding the investigation” (Kant, 20:236); it does not lead to any ontological 
commitments. Second, the connection between the ultimate end (culture) and the final end 
(morality) belongs not to nature, but freedom. It means that this connection is not 
necessary. It is perfectly possible, that a cultured person may never set morality as her end. 
Kant is not a historical determinist like Hegel; his position is closer to that of Rousseau28. 
He does not treat moral progress as something inevitable. In The Conflict of the Faculties 
Kant directly says that “we are not capable of placing ourselves in this position when it is a 
question of the prediction of free actions ... these actions, of course, the human being can 
see, but not foresee with certitude” (Kant, 7: 84). 
 
3.2 The unsocial sociability 
 
As I mentioned in the second chapter, for Kant, all defects of cognition and volition 
are consequences of radical evil of human nature. And from teleological point of view it 
seems that all qualities of human nature should be apt to contribute somehow to socio-
cultural progress29. But how can the propensity to evil contribute to socio-cultural 
progress? 
To begin with, I briefly explain how Kant understands the evil. Human beings have 
three basic predispositions to good: animality, personality, and humanity30. The 
predisposition to animality is what Kant calls a mechanical self-love. It manifests itself in 
the drive for self-preservation, propagation, and communication with others. The 
                                               
28 As Frederick Neuhouser argues “Rousseau’s account of evil shows that, if we can have no guarantee of 
there being a way out of our present fallenness, we can also not know a priori that no such path exists” 
(Neuhouser, 2008, 8). However, we can see that Rousseau’s agnosticism with respect to the possibility of 
moral progress is noticeably more pessimistic. 
29 These qualities are determined by causal mechanical laws; hence, they are the part of nature. 
30 According to Kant, they are natural, not acquired. Hence, they should be treated akin to instincts. But it 
should be noted, that other animals have only the first predisposition and in the limited form. Predispositions 
to humanity and personality are uniquely human. 
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predisposition to personality is “the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a 
sufficient incentive to the power of choice” (Kant, 6:27). It explains why the demands of 
the moral law may influence one’s behavior. The predisposition to humanity consists in the 
comparative self-love. This predisposition gives rise to “the inclination to gain worth in the 
opinion of others” (Kant, 6:27). Basically, it is a drive for recognition. We can find a very 
similar notion of amour-propre (French, "self-love") in Rousseau’s thought. Rousseau 
describes it as an exclusively human sentiment that involves comparisons with others and 
seeing oneself as others see one. 
All three predispositions, considered in themselves, are good. The evil arises only 
when the incentives of two kinds of self-love are prioritized to those of moral law: 
 
Whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives [of 
self-love and morality] that he incorporates into his maxim … but in their subordination (in the form 
of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other. It follows that the human being 
(even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating 
them into his maxims (Kant, 6:36). 
 
Simply stated, the evil consists in a failure to make the moral law the ultimate 
condition of all other maxims. As we can see, Kant’s understanding of the evil is very 
broad. Even the noblest deeds would be manifestations of our propensity to evil, if they are 
done for the wrong reason. It should be noted, that Kant defines it only as a propensity, i.e. 
as “the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination” (Kant, 6:29). It means that it 
is not logically impossible for a human to never develop an inclination to evil. It is just 
highly improbable, if one is in the social condition, where the incentives of the 
comparative self-love are very strong (see Wood, 1999, 288). However, exactly these 
incentives are crucial for explanation how the propensity to evil can contribute to socio-
cultural progress and, hence to one’s ability to exercise freedom of choice. 
Since comparative self-love makes one attach more importance to oneself than to 
others and to demand the same consideration from others, it is the source of never-ending 
antagonism between people. In the essay ‘Idea for a Universal History’ Kant shows a 
strong connection between antagonism and the development of culture. He argues that 
without antagonism human beings would not be very different from the sheep they herd. 
Antagonism causes what Kant oxymoronically calls the unsocial sociability. The unsocial 
sociability has two conflicting components: 
1. The inclination to be associated with others. A human alone is not able to 
satisfy all his needs; hence he has to cooperate with other people. He also 
feels himself “to be more human” (Kant, 8:21) in society, he can achieve 
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more there and it is easier to defend these new achievements with the 
help of others. 
2. The inclination to be isolated from others. A human is always on the 
alert. He is inclined to arrange everything according to his own goals, 
thus abusing the freedom of other people, hence he is expecting the same 
thing from them. This attitude helps him to mobilize all his powers and 
suppress his laziness31 in order to “establish a position for themselves 
among [his] fellows” (Kant, 8:21).  
The drive for recognition stimulates competitiveness between people. As 
Schneewind nicely puts it, “[t]he energies we devote to showing others how much stronger 
and smarter we are lead us to create ingenious inventions and brilliant new ideas that 
gradually enrich and enlighten our strife-ridden common lives” (Schneewind, 2010, 320). 
But in order to get along people – who perceive each other as competitors – often have to 
conceal their real thoughts and feelings. This necessity stimulates the sense of propriety 
which is “an inclination to inspire the respect of others toward our persons through good 
manners (the hiding of that which could arouse disdain)” (Kant, 8:113)32. The sense of 
propriety is double-edged: on the one hand, a person by exercising propriety can trick 
others into respecting her; on the other hand, this person herself may be considered as a 
victim here, because in order to gain an approval of others she has to conform to received 
customs. As Kant says, “[o]n the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more 
they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and 
of unselfishness” (Kant, 7:151). 
  There is a similar antagonism on the international level. All states want to practice 
unrestricted freedom; therefore, they are expecting the abuse of freedom from the other 
states. Never-ending wars and war preparations are the great burden for every state. At the 
same time, the danger of war helps to sustain the level of culture and inner civil liberties, 
because any encroachment on them may weaken economy and, hence the military power 
of the state. In the future, the costs of the antagonism among the states would get bigger, 
                                               
31 Laziness is primarily caused by the predisposition to animality, more specifically, by the uncontrolled 
drive for self-preservation. And the predisposition to humanity, i.e. the drive for recognition helps to 
overcome it. But there are ways in which the drive for recognition can, instead, contribute to laziness. E.g. 
sometimes laziness is stimulated by one’s desire to be efficient. Adopting prejudices as the provisional 
principles that govern transitions between judgments may make one’s productivity higher, but it is still a 
manifestation of laziness. 
32 According to Kant, the origin of the sense of propriety can be found in the control over the sexual instinct. 
Human beings quickly discovered that the stimulus to sex can be prolonged by the means of imagination. 
Concealing object of desire (e.g. by fig leaf) makes this stimulus more moderate and, at the time, more 
enduring and uniform. Thus, the refusal turned merely animal desire to love and feeling “of the merely 
agreeable over to the taste for beauty” (Kant, 8:113). It is the point where human nature makes the certain 
kind of manipulation a necessary component of sociability. 
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and the interconnection among different economies – stronger, thus the defeat of one state 
would have a deteriorating effect on all others. Eventually, all these factors may33 force the 
states to “discover a law of equilibrium ... and to introduce a united power which lends 
force to this law” (Kant, 8:26). Kant refers here to the establishment of cosmopolitan civil 
society, which is the precondition for the full development of all human predispositions 
(see Kant, 8:25), including that to personality. Hence, the antagonism may be regarded as a 
crucial tool which nature uses to prepare people for freedom. 
I argue that, from the teleological point of view, nature, in a sense, tricks people 
into developing culture. People have their own ends; they are driven by comparative self-
love and try to achieve the first and the best rank among others. But by doing this they – 
perhaps, unwillingly – develop their capacities, and bring about socio-cultural progress. Of 
course, it should be stressed, that in a strict sense nature is not a manipulator. Because I 
define manipulation as a deliberate action that aims to change the behavior or beliefs 
through conscious lying or conscious usage of techniques that preclude or hinder a moral 
deliberation; and we do not have sufficient reason to attribute consciousness to nature. 
The unsocial sociability could not last without “the secret falsity in even the closest 
friendship” (Kant, 6:33). Human relations are filled with illusions and pretense, as in order 
to get along people have to conceal their real thoughts and feelings. 
Hence, the manipulative techniques are not just mechanically possible; they are 
essentially interwoven into the very framework of society. We constantly use some of their 
elements in our everyday life, for example, when we behave politely to each other. 
However, there is a very big difference between being a manipulator and being well-
mannered. Not all kinds of actions involving illusions or pretense should be regarded as 
manipulation. I will elaborate on this in the next chapter. 
 
4 The mechanism of manipulation 
 
In the previous chapter, I have shown the role of radical evil of human nature in 
tricking people into developing culture. In this chapter I will tell how a manipulator may 
exploit radical evil for his own ends. I will start by going through how the different 
psychological states make people susceptible to particular manipulative techniques. Then I 
will discuss how the manipulator can direct public opinion and why people tend to believe 
in conspiracy theories. At the end of the chapter I will address the difference between 
                                               
33 This ‘may’ is important here. According to Kant, it is not necessary that the states will be forced to 
discover a law of equilibrium. It is just something we ought to hope for and strive for. 
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manipulation and activities which have similar mechanism, but do not necessary involve 
misrepresentation or bypassing rational deliberation. 
 
4.1 Conformity 
 
In this section I will show how conformity makes a person susceptible to adopting 
false beliefs and prejudices. I define conformity as the compliance with prevailing social 
standards; it is not an inclination, but a certain psychological state, which, however, is 
primarily caused by an inclination, namely by the sense of propriety.  
Kant defines the sense of propriety as “an inclination to inspire the respect of others 
toward our persons through good manners” (Kant, 8:113). This inclination works as glue 
for the unsocial sociability. People have to conceal some of their thoughts and feelings if 
they want to deal with each other. Kant’s account of propriety has connections to 
treatments of it by other early modern philosophers, particularly by Hume and Rousseau. 
For Hume propriety as something immediately agreeable to others is a virtuous trait (see 
Hume, 1978, 591); for Rousseau, it is a social veil on vice and source of evil (see 
Rousseau, 1973, 6). Unlike Hume, Kant does not think that propriety itself has moral 
worth. But his position is also quite distinct from the one of Rousseau, as Kant believes 
that the sense of propriety “gave the first hint toward the formative education of the human 
being as a moral creature” (Kant, 8:112)34. 
At the same time, Kant acknowledges Rousseau’s point that the sense of propriety 
may make people enslaved by public opinion. In the ‘Letter to d'Alembert’ Rousseau 
discusses how it can be used for manipulation. In order to make people consider duels to 
be indecent he proposes to establish a special institution – the Court of Honor – which 
should have a right of setting rules for warranting and conducting an official duel. Then 
with time, these rules should gradually become more and more restrictive to make a 
settlement of conflicts regarding honor free of violence. Rousseau believes that at some 
moment the proponents of duels – forced by the public opinion – would have to renounce 
their beliefs as indecent (see Rousseau, 2004). 
Kant lists three sources of prejudices: imitation, customs and inclinations. It is easy 
to see that they are closely connected. People have an inclination to laziness and the sense 
of propriety (also an inclination); hence, they want to be esteemed by others without doing 
too much. Imitation of others and observance of received customs is the most 
                                               
34 I will elaborate on this in the sixth chapter. 
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straightforward way of achieving this35. Besides, long-lasting imitation may lead to the 
creation of new custom. 
Impact of imitation, customs and inclinations on one’s thought and behavior may 
result in conformity, i.e. the compliance with prevailing social standards. As it involves 
comparisons with others and seeing oneself as others see one, it may seem that conformity 
has a similarity with the maxim of a broad-minded way of thinking – to think in the 
position of everyone else. But this similarity is superficial and there is a fundamental 
difference. A broad-minded way of thinking is an epistemological principle which helps 
one to be impartial36, whereas conformity is a passive effect of comparative self-love: one 
is conformable, because he wants to avoid possible troubles; because he wants to be 
esteemed by others. 
What makes conformity dangerous is that it may lead to an inability to think for 
oneself; it is a state of potentially compromised autonomy37. Conformity makes the person 
very susceptible to adopting false beliefs and prejudices. The prejudice of the prestige of 
the multitude naturally follows from one’s conformity. And this prejudice may easily lead 
to others. For instance: if Ethan adopts the multitude prejudice as his provisional principle, 
then from the cognition that ‘all believe that Mr. Smith is the greatest expert in foreign 
policy’ he may carry out the transition to his own belief that ‘Mr. Smith really is the 
greatest expert in foreign policy’, and then from this belief another prejudice naturally 
follows – that of the prestige of a person. 
A manipulator can easily exploit these prejudices; weak-willed conformists are easy 
targets for him. It should be also noted that the manipulator may try to appeal to non-
existing social standards. For example, Sylvia may tell Kerim that everyone believes in P, 
trying to trick him into believing in P. But let us suppose that, actually, it is not true that 
everyone believes in P, and Sylvia knows it. In that case Sylvia does not really appeal to 
public opinion; she just pretends that she appeals to it. Her act of manipulation involves 
both lying and exploit of the multitude prejudice38. 
Still, the influence of real public opinion is very strong, and manipulators know it. 
It is very hard (at least, psychologically) to sustain autonomy when you are surrounded by 
people – especially if some of them are close or important to you – who strongly believe in 
what you consider a total nonsense. Moreover, your belief that you have such autonomy is 
                                               
35 However, it may be argued that sometimes following customs can be very time- and labor-intensive. In 
these cases the role of an inclination to laziness is more ambiguous. 
36 For more details on the maxim of a broad-minded way of thinking, see the sixth chapter. 
37 I will discuss autonomy at length in the next chapter. 
38 It also can be argued that the success of her lies depends on another prejudice, say, on the prejudice of 
unfounded trust. But I am not going to investigate this interpretation further in this thesis. 
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constantly challenged by the frightening idea that, perhaps, it is you who believes in 
nonsense, while others are perfectly sane. In any case, your conduct is heavily influenced 
by the opinion of others. If you are vociferous in your disagreement, those around you will 
find your conduct outrageous and will try to either help, or force, you to change your 
beliefs. If you remain silent, then you, de facto, refuse to live according to your own 
beliefs. 
 
4.2 Ambition and other passions 
 
Whereas conformity is a passive and calming effect of comparative self-love, 
ambition can be regarded as its active and violent counterpart. In the previous chapter I 
have discussed how competiveness stimulates scientific and cultural progress. People 
mobilize all their powers and suppress their laziness in order to “establish a position for 
themselves among their fellows” (Kant, 8:21). People want to show that they are better 
than others; they are moved by the love of honour. Kant even says that without such a love 
“there would be no incentive to pursue the sciences” (Schmidt, 2016, 43). 
But the love for honour may take an unhealthy form. When one is addicted to 
honour, he becomes ambitious. Ambition can be defined as passion for honour (see Kant, 
25:1141-1142). It involves “three … things: (1) a tendency to think yourself better than 
others, (2) a desire that others think of you as better than they are, and (3) a desire to be 
better than they are” (Wood, 1999, 263). This mixture makes people unsocial, hence 
resistant to the sedative effect of the proprieties. It may even seem that ambition can make 
people less vulnerable to manipulation, because it often forces them to break with 
conformity. Moreover, because ambitious people have a tendency to think that they are 
better than others, they are apt to adopt a very specific prejudice called logical egoism, 
“which takes as completely dispensable the criterion of truth, to compare one's opinions 
with those of other men” (Kant, 24:740). While logical egoism is unsound provisional 
principle, it seems that it may be of help with resisting against manipulation. 
However, ambitious people are opened to another kind of manipulation. They are 
ready to make great sacrifices in order to become esteemed. But the understanding of what 
makes one esteemed can vary greatly and is still closely tied to public opinion. A 
manipulator may try to influence this understanding. Once again, it can be done by 
exploiting prejudices. For example: Daniel is a very ambitious guy, ambitious in a Kantian 
sense. Nadir says that Daniel should join the military, because it would help Daniel to 
become esteemed. Nadir can use different ploys to persuade Daniel that joining the 
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military is the matter of honour and the best way to become esteemed. The most obvious 
way is to appeal to public opinion.  
Actually, I think that if Nadir does not lie, but appeals to real public opinion, he is 
not necessary a manipulator. At the very least, it is a borderline case. Perhaps, Nadir just 
provides a relevant piece of information. Daniel wants to become esteemed, and Nadir tells 
him about the best way to do it. In this case, the reference to public opinion is relevant and 
informative, because the content of esteem is derivative of public opinion. The problem is 
that, from a Kantian perspective, a person in the passionate state is especially disposed 
towards irrational behavior. A passionate person is, basically, an addict in a broad sense. 
Daniel does not just desire to be esteemed; he is fully possessed by his desire. If Nadir has 
his own agenda and knowingly exploits this particularly vulnerable Daniel’s state to 
influence his beliefs and behavior, he is a manipulator. 
But what if Daniel is a firm logical egoist and ostentatiously does not care about 
opinions of others? Well, Nadir may try to present things as if it is, actually, Daniel’s own 
opinion that joining the military is the matter of honour. But while I think that it is 
possible, I struggle to describe in detail how it can be done. Still, even if Daniel is a firm 
logical egoist, he does not derive his opinions from nowhere. Logical egoism is dangerous, 
exactly because it gives a person an unfounded confidence in his independence from the 
external influence. This influence remains invisible for the logical egoist, because he never 
tries to be impartial; he never tries to look at things from someone else’s position. My 
point here is that even a logical egoist leans on public opinion, when he forms his 
understanding of what makes one esteemed. And while an ambitious person may be better 
protected from direct manipulation than those who are conformable, his active passionate 
state makes him a much more desired prey for the manipulator. 
There are other passions besides ambition, such as greed, mania for power, 
vengeance, etc. They also can be exploited by a manipulator in a similar fashion. Say, 
Nadine needs to convince Marcus that if he adopts a certain belief or does a certain thing, it 
will contribute to realizing his passion. If this act of convincing involves lying, or 
conscious (on behalf of Nadine) appeals to prejudices, then it should automatically be 
regarded as manipulation. But if it does not involve them, then, once again, it may be 
baseless to call Nadine a manipulator, as it is a borderline case. However, if she knows that 
Marcus is fully possessed by his passion, and uses true statements to exploit Marcus’s 
passion for her own agenda, I believe, we should regard her as a manipulator. 
 
4.3 Enthusiasm and other affects 
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Affects are similar to passions in that they also preclude rational deliberation, but 
they do it differently. A passionate man finds it incredibly hard to abandon his passion, but, 
at least, he can deliberate on it. He can think how to fulfill his passion; moreover, he tends 
to rationalize it. For instance, an avenger may convince himself that his mania for 
vengeance, actually, is not a passion, but a moral duty. This rationalization – intended to 
repress one’s sense of guilt – is what Kant calls self-deception39. 
Affect does not allow deliberation about itself and means of its realization. While 
passion is structurally a desire, affect is rather a very specific feeling40; a person in the 
affected state is unable to compare “this feeling with the sum of all feelings (of pleasure or 
displeasure)” (Kant, 7:254). Basically, affect disrupts the normal process of choice, and 
other feelings and corresponding desires just end up not being taken into account. A person 
does not deliberate on what she is going to do, as an affect almost immediately leads to 
some action41 or inactivity. For instance, the affect of anger may lead to an uncontrolled 
violent behavior, while “the affect of fright [may] produce a scream” (Kant, 25:600). A 
frightened person does not deliberate on why and how exactly he should scream; it just 
happens. A manipulator can – by provoking an affective state in a manipulatee – trick her 
into doing something that is somehow advantageous for the manipulator. There are 
different methods for different affects: the manipulator can try to infuriate the manipulatee, 
hoping to bait her into violent behavior. Or, perhaps, the manipulator may try to make his 
victim incredibly depressed and unable to do anything. 
I want to consider one particular affect – enthusiasm. Kant defines it as “the idea of 
the good with affect” and notes that “it is a stretching of the powers through ideas, which 
give the mind a momentum that acts far more powerfully and persistently than the impetus 
given by sensory representations” (Kant, 5:272). So, it is a very intensive feeling, caused 
by entertaining some moral idea (i.e. the idea of the good), which may lead to a great 
action. Kant shows an ambivalent attitude towards enthusiasm. On the one hand, in The 
Conflict of the Faculties he regards the enthusiasm of German spectators who follow the 
developments of the French Revolution “as evidence of a moral predisposition or capacity 
for morality, a moral tendency” (Clewis, 2009, 3). Kant also says that “it is commonly 
maintained that without [enthusiasm] nothing great can be accomplished” (Kant, 5:272). 
                                               
39 Self-deception is a particular example of the secret influence of sensibility on the higher faculty of 
cognition. 
40 Perhaps, it is helpful to remind here of Kant’s basic account of human action: “cognition of an object gives 
rise (sometimes) to a feeling of pleasure or pain, and that feeling gives rise (again, sometimes) to a desire or 
aversion for the object” (Frierson, 2014, 56). 
41 ‘Action’ should be understood here in a broad sense; e.g. adoption of a new belief is also an action. 
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However, note, that he does not say that he shares this commonly maintained opinion! 
Moreover, he believes that “every affect is blind … for it is that movement of the mind that 
makes it incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine 
itself in accordance with them” (Kant, 7:275). It seems that Kant does not regard 
enthusiasm as something good; he rather implies that its presence signifies that there is 
something good in human nature, because it shows that people can be moved by the moral 
ideas. However, the enthusiasm itself is an affect, and as the affect it is not good. It 
precludes rational deliberation and easily may lead to the very grim consequences. A 
manipulator may try to provoke enthusiasm in his victim. For instance, Tavish may tell 
Lycus in the gruesome and exaggerated form (i.e. using framing) that Olivia has done 
some truly horrendous things, but remained unpunished. Tavish’s story has a close 
connection with the moral idea of justice. It may cause in Lycus two affects at a time: 
anger and enthusiasm. As result, Lycus may unreflectively do something that Lycus wants 
him to do. 
 
4.4 Changing public opinion 
 
Affects can be also used for managing or directing public opinion. Previously, I 
only discussed how the manipulator can either appeal to public opinion or pretend that he 
appeals to it. However, if the manipulator has enough resources, he may also try to manage 
or direct public opinion. Here we are talking about a very specific kind of manipulation – 
political manipulation. There are three basic ways to do it. 
1. The first way is demonstrated in Rousseau’s example of the Court of Honor42. 
Usually, it is a gradual process, as the public opinion needs to be changed imperceptibly. 
For instance, at first, say, it is inappropriate to be interested in the private life of the ruler, 
but then step-by-step it may also become inappropriate to discuss his political decisions. 
These imperceptible changes can be especially efficient in the isolated communities, where 
it is impossible to consider the external view. However, this gradual change in public 
opinion can also be caused by the morally neutral means. For example, a modern education 
may change public opinion on GMOs. I do not think that directing public opinion through 
education – provided it is free from indoctrination – should be regarded as manipulation 
from a Kantian perspective, as education strengthens, rather than hinders people’s ability to 
think for themselves. 
                                               
42 See the section 4.1. 
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2. The second way to manage public opinion is to just massively falsify it. People 
largely learn about public opinion through media and sociology. Both of them can transmit 
false information. If people are conformable, they adjust their attitudes accordingly, and 
this leads to a real change in public opinion. 
3. The third way of directing public opinion involves making use of affects. It 
allows to drastically change public opinion in a short space of time. As I have said before, 
affects may lead to rash actions, and ‘action’ here is to be understood broadly, for instance, 
the adoption of a new belief is also an action. It works as follows, a manipulator transmits 
information to people in a very specific way, he uses framing to provoke a certain emotion 
(i.e. affect) in them. For instance, Mr. Petrov is a talking head. He tries to frighten people, 
exposing (or even lying about) some horrible misdoings, made by the representatives of a 
certain ethnic group. Mr. Petrov especially focuses that it is made by people belonging to 
this ethnicity. If he does it alone, he may have some influence on people. But if almost all 
his colleagues are transmitting the same thing, this influence can be incredibly strong. And 
what is especially interesting is that afterwards it is quite hard for people to reject this 
affectedly acquired belief, because they know that it is shared by others. Hence, it is 
already a matter of conformity. And conformity may cause rationalization of this new 
belief and, as result, self-deception. 
 
4.5 The attractiveness of conspiracy theories 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed Kant’s account of natural. According to it, 
purposiveness is “a principle for guiding the investigation” (Kant, 20:236). Something is 
purposive when it appears as if designed or produced according to the idea of some 
purpose. A manipulator can misuse teleology for his own ends; he can invent a rather crazy 
explanatory scheme, i.e. a conspiracy theory. Such a theory may unite a lot of unrelated 
persons and events into some system; usually it also assumes that there is someone who 
arranged all these events and who is going to benefit from them.  
There are two reasons why the conspiracy theory is a product of the improper 
usage of teleology. First, teleology should be applied only to the real systems. In other 
words, there should be real connections between different parts of the concerned object. It 
is reasonable to assume that there are such connections within a living organism. It is also 
reasonable (but, perhaps, slightly less reasonable) to assume that there are such 
connections within nature as whole. But those systems that are presented in typical 
conspiracy theories are usually insufficiently grounded. They either lack any proofs that 
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there are any real connections between their parts, or they try to justify these connections 
by appeals to prejudices43. Teleology should not be applied to a non-existing system, it is a 
fallacy. 
Second, Kant explicitly says that we cannot use teleology to determine “whether ... 
purposiveness is intentional or unintentional” (Kant, 20:236). Hence, even if connections 
between different persons and events presented in the conspiracy theory are real, teleology 
cannot prove that there really is a designer of conspiracy who is going to benefit from it. 
Perhaps, it is just a very complicated system composed of the unlucky contingencies. 
Still, people may easily accept a conspiracy theory just because it is natural for 
them to think teleologically and systematically in order to understand a certain phenomena. 
A skillful manipulator knows about this tendency and may use it for his own advantage. 
 
4.6 The concept of manipulation 
 
In this section I want to synthesize all my intuitions concerning manipulation in 
order to elucidate its concept, which can be used for distinguishing between manipulation 
and seemingly similar, but actually different phenomena. 
I have discussed above the various manipulative techniques. All of them involve 
either lying or bypassing rational deliberation. Rational deliberation can be bypassed either 
by exploiting a certain psychological state of a manipulatee, or by appealing to the 
prejudices he has. We can say that manipulation is necessarily epistemically defective. 
According to Sheryl Tuttle Ross something “is epistemically defective if either it is false, 
inappropriate, or connected to other beliefs in ways that are inapt, misleading, or 
unwarranted” (Ross, 2002, 23).  
However, there are some phenomena that may be called epistemically defective, 
but still it would be rather strange to classify them as manipulation. The proprieties are the 
most obvious example. While good manners are, in a sense, misleading, it would be an 
overkill to call every well-mannered person a manipulator. 
Or, another example, the separation of powers has a certain similarity with 
manipulation. Different branches are competing with each other, but their ambition serves 
a different end. They – perhaps, unwillingly – limit each other, thus preventing the 
concentration of power. As Kant says, even a nation of devils can have good governance, 
the only thing that is needed is  
 
                                               
43 E.g. by appealing to the multitude prejudice: “all believe that A and B are connected”. 
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to organize them and arrange a constitution for them in such a way that, although they strive against 
each other in their private intentions, the latter check each other in such a way that the result in their 
public conduct is just as if they had no such evil intentions (Kant, 8:366). 
 
Should we classify this arrangement as manipulation? Once again, I think we 
should not. Both examples involve an illusion. The one who is well-mannered creates an 
illusion that he is also a morally good person. The efficient separation of powers results in 
an illusion that those who are in power have no evil intentions; moreover, those who are in 
power may have their own illusions that the goal of this separation is to provide an arena 
for competition. 
But there is a great difference between these illusions and misrepresentations that 
are characteristic of manipulation. As Frierson notes, “the effect of illusions does not wear 
off when one knows the truth” (Frierson, 2005, 116). A polite person can still be agreeable 
to others, even if they know that her politeness does not mean much. A politician usually 
perfectly knows that his intended ambitious actions have unintended consequences of 
being check and balances for the actions of others, but it does not make him less ambitious. 
In other words, these illusions do not necessarily involve misrepresentation or bypassing 
rational deliberation, they can be efficient even if it is absolutely clear that they are just 
illusions. It is different in case of manipulation. If one fully acknowledges that he is 
manipulated into doing something that he does not really want to do, he has a really good 
motivation, at least, to try to resist manipulation. 
The last thing I want to stress here is that a person in question should at least to 
some extent realize what he is doing in order to be called a manipulator. If Delmar says 
something to Mia, which suddenly provokes a passionate or affected state in her, it does 
not necessary mean that Delmar is a manipulator. If Mia’s reaction was impossible to 
predict, Delmar’s actions cannot be classified as manipulation. 
Hence, manipulation is a deliberate action that aims to change the behavior or 
beliefs through conscious lying or conscious usage of techniques that preclude or hinder a 
moral deliberation. 
 
5 Personal autonomy as a solution 
 
In the previous chapters I discussed at length how manipulation is mechanically 
possible and why it is so efficient. In this chapter I am going to look into how we can 
protect ourselves from manipulation.  In particular, I will consider how Kant understands 
relations between autonomy and enlightenment. What is of interest to me is whether Kant’s 
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idea of autonomy can somehow contribute to precluding or resisting manipulation. I will 
also touch upon the issue of moral responsibility for manipulation. 
Earlier, I have argued that manipulation from a Kantian perspective involves either 
lying or bypassing rational deliberation. Bypassing rational deliberation can have different 
forms. 
a) When manipulator (A) successfully appeals to the prejudices of the 
manipulatee (B), the transition between two cognitions in B is carried out 
by means of unsound connection, resulted “from empirical influence on 
human cognition” (Frierson, 2014, 196). In other words, B goes from one 
belief to another using the irrational provisional principle. E.g. A can tell 
B that everyone believes P, and B may infer from it that she also should 
believe P. In that case A exploits the prejudice of the prestige of the 
multitude. 
b) When A provokes an affective state in B, the latter finds herself unable to 
reflect on her feeling and corresponding desire. E.g. A can tell or show B 
in the gruesome and exaggerated form that a third person has done some 
horrendous things. If B lacks strong enough self-mastery, it may provoke 
an uncontrollable burst of anger in her, bypassing any reflection and 
leading to the irrational behavior which may be somehow advantageous 
for A. 
c) When A provokes a passionate state in B, the latter – while she can reflect 
on how to pursue her passion – finds herself unable to check whether this 
passion is consistent with morals, happiness as a whole, and with other 
inclinations. E.g. A can convince B that doing X is a matter of honor44. It 
may cause B to sacrifice her own well-being and high moral standards for 
a dubious goal. What makes it different from the affect case is that here 
the manipulatee is not fully precluded from the rational deliberation. For 
instance, she can be very inventive in her means of pursuing passions. 
These cases are idealized. It is possible and even plausible that the most effective 
cases of manipulation involve simultaneous lying, appeals to prejudices, and attempts to 
provoke affects and passions in the manipulatee. What unites all these three cases is that 
the manipulator tries to exploit the manipulatee’s inability or unwillingness to use her own 
understanding. The latter is the main topic of Kant’s famous essay ‘Answering the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?’ 
                                               
44 Mania for honor is a paradigmatic example of passion. See Kant, 7:268. 
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5.1 Moral autonomy and personal autonomy 
 
Kant states that the motto of enlightenment is “Sapere aude45! Have the courage to 
make use of your own [understanding]!” (Kant, 8:35) If a person lacks the courage, then, 
according to Kant, she lives in the state of self-incurred immaturity. It is important that for 
Kant courage (or self-mastery, or moral strength) is the most crucial virtue (see Louden, 
2011, 27). If one lacks it one cannot be truly committed to one’s principles. Kant notes that 
“the very Latin word virtus originally signifies nothing else but courage, strength and 
constancy” (Kant, 27:492). In another essay he restates that “the maxim of always thinking 
for oneself is enlightenment” (Kant, 8:146n). It seems that the enlightenment maxim is 
supposed, among other things, to help one defend oneself against manipulation; Kant says 
that if one adopts this maxim then “superstition and enthusiasm disappear”46 (Kant, 
8:146n). But what does it mean to think for oneself? 
 
To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to 
assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one 
assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason (Kant, 8:146n). 
 
This enlightenment maxim shares some similarity with Kant’s formula of the 
universal law: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it become a universal law” (Kant, 4:421). This similarity becomes even more 
noticeable in the third critique, where Kant notes that this maxim is “of a reason that is 
never passive. The tendency toward the latter, hence toward heteronomy of reason, is 
called prejudice” (Kant, 5:294). What is important here is that Kant contrasts the activity of 
the enlightened reason with its heteronomy47. It implies that the goal of enlightenment is 
the achievement of autonomy. It is striking that in the essay on enlightenment Kant does 
not mention autonomy at all. In the following I am going to investigate whether being 
autonomous helps one to protect oneself from being manipulated. 
Autonomy – as Kant defines it – is the capacity of the rational will to be self-
legislative (see Kant, 4:432-433). There are two aspects of exercising autonomy. The first 
aspect is negative; according to it the autonomous will is not governed by any external 
cause. Human nature is the external cause for Kant, hence any action caused exclusively by 
                                               
45 Latin phrase meaning ‘Dare to know’. 
46 According to Kant, superstition is “the greatest prejudice of all” (Kant, 5:294) and enthusiasm is “the idea 
of the good with affect” (Kant, 5:272). 
47 Passions and affects hinder rational deliberation; hence they also lead to heteronomy.  
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an inclination or instinct cannot be considered autonomous48. That is why actions caused 
by passions and affects are not autonomous. The second aspect of exercising autonomy is 
positive. According to it, autonomy does not amount to arbitrariness, i.e. it still presumes 
very specific laws. And while these laws are self-prescribed, they are, at the same time, 
universally true for every rational being. These laws are the laws of morals, hence Kant’s 
autonomy often referred in the secondary literature as moral autonomy. It is coherent with 
what Kant says: “[a]utonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the 
duties conforming to them” (Kant, 5:33). 
Kant treats moral autonomy as a capacity (see Kant 4:438; O’Neill, 1990, 75-76; 
Formoza, 2013, 194-195). All people who have a capacity to follow the moral law are 
autonomous, that is why they are responsible for their choices. They do not need to 
exercise autonomy in order to be regarded as autonomous, as the possible legislators of 
moral law. It means that, for Kant, almost all people are morally autonomous, only those 
who are severely mentally impaired can be excluded. But it is definitely not the case that 
only severely mentally impaired people are susceptible to manipulation. However, there is 
a very quick solution to this: it is possible to distinguish between being autonomous as 
having a capacity of autonomy and being autonomous as exercising this capacity. Actually, 
Kant himself makes the distinction between the will (Wille) and choice (Willkür) (see Kant, 
5:36). While every person has the autonomous will, it does not mean that she always 
chooses autonomously (see Formoza, 2013, 195). 
In a sense, Kant’s idea of autonomy gives us infallible knowledge. More precisely, 
it gives us an infallible way to check whether a certain maxim (a practical principle) is 
morally permissible; we just need to check whether it is universalizable49. But it seems that 
the applicability of the universalizability test for protecting one from manipulation is quite 
limited. In some cases it may be obvious that a certain maxim imposed on a person by a 
manipulator is immoral per se. For instance, the manipulator may persuade the manipulatee 
that someone should be killed. But while the maxim of killing someone is obviously 
incompatible with the moral law, the manipulatee is unable to properly conduct the 
universalizability test if she is in the affective or passionate state. Hence, there is a circle: 
you cannot check the maxim if you do not exercise autonomy in the first place. 
                                               
48 It does not mean that any influence of psychology automatically leads to heteronomy. If a person is fully 
determined by a rational principle to do something, and her inclinations (virtues) assist her in doing it, her 
action is autonomous. Or, conversely, even if a person is fully determined by a rational principle to do 
something, and her inclinations hinder her from doing it, she still can be successfully moved by her principle; 
and in that case her action is autonomous too. 
49 If the maxim generates a contradiction when universalized, then it is not compatible with the moral law. 
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Moreover, when Kant talks about the lack of courage to use one’s own 
understanding, he does not talk not only about the purely moral sphere. It seems that 
manipulation may involve communicating maxims that are not directly incompatible with 
the moral law, but still very undesirable for the manipulatee. For example, someone can be 
manipulated into support of the law, which is going to be very disadvantageous for him in 
the long term. My initial intuition here is that in this case the manipulatee does not adopt 
the morally dubious maxim50, but still he is obviously a victim of manipulation. 
Kant’s idea of autonomy is closely connected with morals. It may seem that we 
need the concept of personal rather than moral autonomy to deal with manipulation. 
Personal autonomy involves “governing [oneself] in the pursuit of [one’s] own conception 
of the good” (Formoza, 2013, 193). According to it, “the free choice of goals and 
relations” is “an essential ingredient of individual well-being” (Raz, 1988, 369). 
Manipulation compromises one’s ability to choose what is right or good in one’s own 
opinion. In other words, manipulation deprives one of personal autonomy. I argue that the 
enlightenment maxim endorses personal autonomy, as it can be applied to the variety of 
cases, some of which are not related to the morals. But it does not follow from this that 
personal autonomy does not contribute to morals from a Kantian perspective. I hold that 
there are, at least, two important conceptual connections between moral autonomy and the 
enlightenment maxim: 
1. The enlightenment maxim necessarily follows from the demands of morals. The 
refusal to think for oneself is a failure to respect humanity in one's own person. In the 
enlightenment essay Kant clearly says that it is the duty “of every human being to think for 
himself” (Kant, 8:36). And from that perspective there was something morally dubious 
about the manipulatee’s maxims if he did not adopt the enlightenment maxim when he was 
manipulated into support of the undesirable law. As Schneewind points out, “[t]he failure 
of courage to use our own reason is a moral failure” (Schneewind, 2010, 316). Kant even 
explains the cause of this moral failure. It lies in radical evil of human nature. Kant’s 
understanding of evil is rather unusual: 
 
Whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives [of 
self-love and morality] that he incorporates into his maxim … but in their subordination (in the form 
of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other. It follows that the human being 
(even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating 
them into his maxims (Kant, 6:36). 
 
                                               
50 He may truly believe that this law is very beneficial not only for him, but for the whole humankind. 
Endorsing such the law is not only compatible with the demands of morals; endorsing it is an imperfect duty 
to others. 
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The human beings have a propensity to evil. In other words, they have propensity 
“knowingly and consistently to choose maxims contrary to the moral law” (Louden, 2011, 
33). As I argued, the enlightenment maxim follows from the moral law. When people 
consciously choose maxims which are based on the inclinations (e.g. on laziness), they 
break the moral law. 
It should be noted, however, that someone who has adopted the enlightenment 
maxim can still be fooled by a manipulator. In that case, he does nothing wrong. What I 
want to stress here is that the enlightenment maxim is not the guaranteed defender against 
manipulation. As I will show in the next chapter, it allows checking the provisional 
principles on which one bases one’s judgments, but not the judgments themselves. 
However, by checking the principles we may improve our chances on making our 
judgments more reliable. Thus, the enlightenment maxim is beneficial for theoretical 
reason. In a sense it provides a connection between theoretical and practical reason, with 
the former subordinated to the latter (see O’Neil, 1990, 24-27). 
2. The second connection between autonomy and the enlightenment maxim can be 
found within Kant’s philosophy of history: 
 
Here the first true steps are taken from brutishness to culture, which consists, actually, in the social 
worth of human beings. And here all of the talents are gradually developed, taste is formed, and, 
even, through continual enlightenment, the beginning of a foundation is laid for a manner of 
thinking which is able, over time, to transform the primitive natural predisposition for moral 
discernment into definite practical principles and, in this way, to ultimately transform an agreement 
to society that initially had been pathologically coerced into a moral whole. (Kant, Idea, 8:21) 
 
Enlightenment is important, because through it human beings can become moral. 
According to Kant, nature itself cannot make people moral, as morals is the matter of 
freedom; however, nature can by means of antagonism coerce human beings into the 
culture51 which is understood as “[t]he production of the aptitude of a rational being for 
any ends in general (thus those of his freedom)” (Kant, 5:431). The enlightenment maxim 
necessarily follows from the demands of morals and, at the same time, governs theoretical 
reason, it helps us to be more successful at making judgments and, hence at attaining our 
ends. Thus, the enlightenment contributes to what Kant calls the culture of skill which can 
be defined “as the capacity to attain the ends that humankind sets for itself, whatever they 
may be” (Allison, 2009, 24). Eventually, it may lead to the establishment of cosmopolitan 
civil society and the perpetual peace, which is the precondition for the full development of 
all human predispositions (see Kant, 8:25), including that to personality. “The 
                                               
51 I discuss it in details in the third chapter. 
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predisposition to personality is the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a 
sufficient incentive to the power of choice” (Kant, 6:27). Hence, the perpetual peace is a 
precondition for moralization of humanity52. 
 
5.2 Who is to blame? 
 
I am going to end this chapter with a more detailed discussion of the moral 
responsibility for manipulation. It is easy to see why a manipulatee can be regarded as 
prudentially responsible for her own misfortunes: she was not prepared and vigilant 
enough, so she fell a victim to manipulation. But it seems that, from a Kantian perspective, 
a manipulatee should also be regarded as morally guilty for not respecting her own 
humanity. Some may see it as a quite undesired consequence of a Kantian theory of 
manipulation. Is it a good theory, if it puts blame on a victim? Well, I have a few things to 
say about it. 
First, the moral responsibility for not respecting one’s own humanity is not 
necessary related to manipulation. On the one hand, if a person does not think for herself, 
she is already guilty for not respecting her own humanity. She does not need to be 
manipulated in order to be morally responsible for not thinking for herself. On the other 
hand, even if a manipulator fails at influencing his victim’s beliefs and actions, i.e. even if 
there is no actual victim, a manipulator is still to blame, as he does not respect humanity in 
the face of the other (i.e. a potential manipulatee). Therefore, these are two distinct 
responsibilities, which are not really connected. The guilt of the manipulator does not 
depend on whether he is successful or not. The guilt of a person who is unwilling to think 
for herself also does not depend on whether she ends up being manipulated or not. 
Second, while the responsibility for manipulation is fully on the manipulator, we 
can regard a manipulatee as prudentially and morally responsible for being weak in the 
face of manipulation. Perhaps, it sounds not very inspiring, but this kind of responsibility 
does not justify manipulation in any sense. Instead, a Kantian theory of manipulation 
shows that we have a potential that can be realized. In other words, it stresses the fact that 
every person can (and ought to) contribute to her own security from manipulation. 
Third, even that responsibility for being weak in the face of manipulation is not 
homogeneous. Kant primarily speaks about people who are unwilling to think for 
themselves. He also compares this unwillingness with immaturity. It means that he does 
                                               
52 However, it cannot force people to become moral (see Kant 7:93), as the moral progress is the result of 
spontaneous acts of freedom. From a Kantian perspective, the moral progress cannot be ‘caused’ by any 
external force. 
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not expect, for instance, that kids should be morally responsible for being manipulated. 
The same can be said about people who are deprived of any possibility to develop their 
understanding. Moreover, Kant says that those people who are in the affected state should 
not be considered responsible neither for their state, nor for the actions they do in this 
state53. An affect is “a lack of virtue and, as it were, something childish and weak, which 
can indeed coexist with the best will” (Kant 6:408). It completely bypasses any rational 
deliberation. According to Kant, a person cannot be held accountable for an action, which 
was fully automatic. Of course, a person has a duty to cultivate his virtues, but Kant 
defines this duty as wide or imperfect. "Wide duties are duties to set ends. We are required 
to have these ends, but it is left up to us what and how much we do in pursuit of them" 
(Wood, 1999, 44). Hence, technically, even if a person is doing almost nothing in order to 
cultivate her virtues, she cannot be regarded as doing something morally bad. 
Fourth, a person is not obliged to do something impossible. Kant claims that 
‘ought’ always presupposes ‘can’ (cf. Kant, 3:A548/B576). If a person does everything she 
can and still ends up being manipulated, it would be wrong to regard her as prudentially 
and morally responsible for this. While she has a certain potential for defending herself 
from manipulation, this potential is socially dependent. One may do as much as it is 
possible in these particular social conditions. For example, one cannot properly think in a 
broad-minded way, if the public use of reason (e.g. free speech) is severally limited. 
  
6 What can we do? 
 
 In the previous chapter I assumed that the enlightenment maxim to always think for 
oneself may contribute to our defense against manipulation by establishing personal 
autonomy. I also argued that the enlightenment maxim necessary follows from the 
demands of morals. We need to use our own understanding in all spheres, because, 
otherwise, we fail to obey the moral law in that that we fail to treat humanity with respect 
in our own person. In this chapter I want to consider in details what it means – to use one’s 
own understanding – and how precisely it can help us to resist manipulation. I will argue 
that it involves three interconnected thought experiments that are akin to the 
universalizability test of moral autonomy. I will also argue that these three thought 
experiments are actually three different perspectives on the one and the same thought 
experiment.  
                                               
53 I am talking here only about moral responsibility. From a Kantian point of view, it does not necessary 
follow from this that people in the affected state are also released from legal responsibility. 
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 In some his texts Kant adds to the enlightenment maxim – to think for oneself – 
two others that are closely connected to it: to think in the position of everyone else and 
always to think in accord with oneself. In the Lectures on Logic Kant terms these tree 
maxims “[u]niversal rules and conditions for avoiding error” (Kant, 9:57), in the third 
critique – “the maxims of the common human understanding” (Kant, 5:294), in the 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic of View – “[t]he precept for reaching [wisdom]”, where 
wisdom “is an idea of a practical use of reason that conforms perfectly with the law” (Kant 
7:200). It should be stressed that all these maxims are supposed to govern not our 
judgments themselves, but the principles on which we base our judgments, i.e. provisional 
principles54. In the following I will examine these maxims one by one and will argue that 
they are three different formulations of one principle55. 
 
6.1 The maxim of reason's self-preservation 
 
The first maxim is the maxim of enlightenment – to think for oneself. Kant also 
calls it the maxim of reason's self-preservation. Here is how it works: 
  
To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to 
assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one 
assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to 
himself; and with this examination he will see superstition and enthusiasm disappear, even if he falls 
far short of having the information to refute them on objective grounds (Kant, 8:146n). 
 
 Kant basically proposes a test for provisional principles. As Onora O’Neill nicely 
puts it, the provisional principles should be “neither self-stultifying nor self-defeating in 
use” (O’Neill, 1990, 38). If our provisional principle fails this test by justifying a false 
judgment, then it should be discarded. In order to check the principle we need to try to 
imagine any possible situation where the judgment based on this principle turns out to be 
false. If such a situation is impossible, then this principle is a proper principle of 
understanding (in a broader sense).  
However, this test seems to be too demanding. I will illustrate it with an example: 
suppose that Yuval has made nine true statements, and we know it for sure. Does our 
experience of previous Yuval’s truthfulness justify trust in his future statements? 
According to Kant, it does not. Because it is not unthinkable that the person who had been 
truthful nine times would lie in the future. 
                                               
54 See the second chapter for the detailed account of provisional principles. 
55 It is akin to three different formulations of the moral law in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
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Kant discards any appeal to any kind of a reputation as a proper principle of 
justification. It is a safe position, but it seems to be counter-productive, because very often 
we just have to base our judgments on the non-ideal principles. What makes this position 
even stranger is the fact that Kant regards induction as a proper principle of 
understanding56 and calls it the source of comparative universality (see Kant, 3:B124/A91), 
whereas it is quite possible to imagine a situation where reliance on induction leads to the 
false judgment. What is the difference between relying on induction in the theoretical 
matters and relying on reputation in the practical matters? As I see it, for Kant, the 
practical matters are fundamentally different, because they involve rational beings 
characterized by transcendental freedom57. The only authority that everyone ought to 
recognize is the authority of reason; the authority of reputation never can be universal. 
 It may be argued that while the good reputation of the source cannot be the reason 
for taking the information from it for granted, it may be prudent to take the good reputation 
of the source as a reason for paying attention to what it communicates. But, of course, you 
still need to use the proper principles of understanding (i.e. not the appeal to the 
reputation), when you are assessing this information. This pragmatic principle may help 
one to deal with the information overload, as Kant acknowledges that prejudices can be 
“true provisional judgments; what is wrong is only that they hold for us as … determining 
judgments58” (Kant, 9:75-76). Still, it seems that this pragmatic principle is not compatible 
with the strong epistemic requirements of the enlightenment maxim, as it is quite easy to 
imagine a situation where this principle disables one from getting the information from the 
truthful source with the bad reputation. 
 As I have already stated in the previous chapter, the enlightenment maxim endorses 
the cultivation of the virtue of courage: “Have the courage to make use of your own 
[understanding]!” (Kant, 8:35) Kant treats courage (or self-mastery, or moral strength) as 
the most crucial virtue (see Louden, 2011, 27), if one lacks it one cannot be truly 
committed to one’s principles. Courage or self-mastery helps one to cope with affects and 
                                               
56 More exactly, a principle of the power of judgment. 
57 Perhaps, it would become clearer if we apply to the issue the concept of possible worlds. According to 
Kant, it is possible to imagine that this particular person could have done otherwise, even under the virtually 
same circumstances; but it is absolutely impossible to imagine that the natural laws governing the nature 
could be different, as, for Kant, they are necessary (i.e. the same in the every possible world). You can apply 
induction to inanimate and non-rational entities, because they are governed exclusively by natural laws. In 
contrast with them, the rational beings as noumenons are also subject to the causality of freedom; hence, the 
appeal to the reputation cannot be a reliable principle. Of course, Kant himself does not use the concept of 
possible worlds. I use it here only for the illustrative purpose. 
58 The difference is that a prejudice may lead to the right judgment. Hence, it may have some provisional 
merit. However, it would be wrong to think that the rightness of the judgment follows from the prejudice. In 
other words, the prejudice cannot justify the right judgment. 
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passions, hence it can be said that it is the most important virtue one should have in order 
to defend oneself from manipulation. 
 The enlightenment maxim also helps us to be more successful at making judgments 
and, hence at attaining our ends. Thus, it contributes to what Kant calls the culture of skill 
which can be defined “as the capacity to attain the ends that humankind sets for itself, 
whatever they may be” (Allison, 2009, 24). Kant perceives some passions59 as the product 
of the social development. According to him, they can be pacified by the further socio-
cultural development60. Thus, by contributing through the enlightenment to the cultural 
development one makes passions less dangerous. 
  
6.2 The maxim of a broad-minded way of thinking 
 
According to the second maxim, one should think in the position of everyone else. 
One is thinking in a broad way 
 
if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so 
many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint 
(which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others) (Kant, 5:294n). 
  
The second maxim stresses the pluralism of reason, but it also has connection with 
Kant’s idea of universality, which was already introduced in the previous maxim. Already 
in the first critique Kant stresses that reason is necessarily public, “and its pronouncement 
[in people] is never more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able, 
without holding back, to utter his qualms indeed, even his veto” (Kant, 3:A739/B767). 
Why is the pluralism of reason important? Every human being has propensity to 
subordinate the laws of reason to her own inclinations (i.e. propensity to evil). Very often it 
is necessary to look at one’s own situation from the impartial position in order to 
understand that the principles on which you justify your judgments are wrong, as you may 
overlook some incompatibilities between standpoints of different people which would arise 
were these people to base their judgment on the provisional principle in question. Hence, in 
addition to the enlightenment maxim we need another test or thought experiment, which is 
aimed to help the one to judge from a universal standpoint61. 
                                               
59 For instance, Kant holds that envy, ingratitude, spite, manias for honor, power, and wealth have a social 
origin. 
60 I will elaborate on this in the third and fourth chapters. 
61 Cf. with Hume’s concept of the extensive sympathy and the general point of view (see Hume, 1978, 581). 
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However, the efficiency of this test depends on the possibility of free 
communication. One cannot even imagine oneself speaking from the authority of reason, if 
there is no possibility for the public discussion. The best way to find the proper principles 
of understanding “is to encourage the increasingly public use of reason” (O’Neill, 1990, 
38). The public use of reason is associated with scholar’s right to discuss and criticize all 
deficiencies in any sphere. According to Kant, every civilian can be such scholar in her 
free time (see Kant, 8:36). All of laws and regulations are subject to discuss and change. 
Any generation should have an opportunity to call in question any decision made before it. 
The problem is that the public use of reason is actually something which is not under our 
personal control. However, as I already showed, the adoption of the enlightenment maxim 
may contribute to socio-cultural development and may eventually lead to the establishment 
of cosmopolitan civil society and the perpetual peace (see Kant, 8:25). It is possible to 
argue that it is our wide duty to strive for freedom to make the public use of one’s reason 
possible in all matters. But in the end it is not something that you can achieve purely on 
your own. It is more like a long-term strategy to limit external threats to reliability of our 
judgments.  
Public use of reason has another interesting consequence which may be of use for 
coping with manipulation. One’s attempt to judge from a universal standpoint helps one to 
cultivate the virtue of courage or self-mastery. In order to get to the universal standpoint, 
she must be willing to listen to the others; it is not an easy goal and involves an exercise of 
the virtue of self-mastery. Moreover, the universal standpoint may have an effect on our 
inclinations. For someone, who lives in the isolated community, the demands of propriety 
can be devastating. It may be inappropriate to discuss the king here, or to criticize the laws. 
The sense of propriety may make a person a weak-willed conformist in this community62. 
However, if one is a part of the cosmopolitan community and judges from the universal 
standpoint, then the effects of propriety may be quite beneficent both for morals and 
reliability of one’s judgments. 
Kant believes that propriety “gave the first hint toward the formative education of 
the human being as a moral creature” (Kant, 8:112). Hence promoting propriety should be 
regarded as a wide duty towards oneself and others (see Kant, 6:473). The attempt to be 
polite reveals to oneself, and helps to develop, self-mastery. Through self-mastery one is 
able to resist one’s self-deception about the impossibility of virtue. In other words, self-
mastery helps one to prevent self-exemption from the moral law based on the false belief 
                                               
62 This negative effect of propriety was discussed in the fourth chapter. 
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that one is just unable to be virtuous. And I have already discussed the role of self-mastery 
in coping with manipulation. 
 
6.3 The maxim of consistency 
 
According to the third maxim, one must always think in accord with oneself. Kant 
says that it is “the most difficult to achieve, and can only by achieved through the 
combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them 
automatic” (Kant, 5:295). It is the basic regulative principle of rational thought and, at the 
same time, it implies our duty to strive for perfection of our reason. Our hierarchy of 
maxims should be consistent. The maxims of the moral law should have the highest 
priority. Others should be combined in the coherent manner as well. For example, if a 
person knowingly chooses something that is moderately useful in the short-term 
perspective and extremely disadvantageous in the long term perspective, then he obviously 
bases his judgments on the unsound provisional principles. 
It is important to stress that second and third maxim work as check-and-balances 
system for the first one. The unreflective adherence to the first maxim alone easily can lead 
person to the state of self-assurance which can even prevent him from realizing that his 
rational will is determined by external causes. I think there is a striking similarity between 
these three maxims. It seems that it is just impossible to adopt one of them without 
adopting others as well. If one wants to think for oneself, she needs to find the universal 
principle which is correct for everyone and does not produce any inconsistencies. If one 
wants to think in the position of everyone else, she needs to be impartial, it is impossible 
without thinking for oneself; she also wants to find the universal principles; it is impossible 
without thinking consistently. And if one wants to think consistently, she needs to find the 
universal principles which are correct for everyone, once again, it is impossible without 
thinking for oneself. Therefore, I argue, that these three principles are in fact the three 
different formulations of one and the same principle. Adopting it involves a very 
sophisticated thought experiment which helps us to check our provisional maxims, to 
cultivate self-mastery and, eventually, to contribute to the socio-cultural development of 
the humankind. 
It is a normative principle; it tells us how we should think; it does not tell how we 
really think. For Kant, ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’ (see Kant, 3:A548/B576), and it seems 
that following this principle is not logically impossible. On the other hand, it is not 
logically impossible to be saint, however no one succeeds. Kant’s anthropology shows that 
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he was fully aware that the human beings are not perfect and they live in an imperfect 
society, and all its imperfection is the result of their free choices. Still, he shows that it is 
no logically impossible that we can change it for the better. In an imperfect society 
adopting the enlightenment maxim may be counter-productive; sometimes, it is more 
productive to be guided by prejudices here. But at the very least, the enlightenment 
principle leads us to recognize that prejudices, passions and affects may lead us up a blind 
alley, and that there is always another possibility. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In my thesis, I have argued that Kant’s pragmatical anthropology and empirical 
psychology can explain us why people are susceptible to manipulation. I have shown that 
people’s susceptibility to manipulation can be causally explained by some defects in 
cognition and volition, namely by prejudices, affects and passions. I have argued that the 
manipulative techniques are efficient because they are essentially interwoven with the 
underlying principles of social order. 
A Kantian theory of manipulation has good explanatory power and provides us with 
an unorthodox perspective on a manipulatee. It considers a manipulatee as prudentially and 
morally responsible for being vulnerable in the face of manipulation. This kind of 
responsibility does not justify manipulation in any way, but underlines that every person 
can contribute to her own security from manipulation. I have shown that it can be done 
through striving for personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is to be established through 
adoption of Kant’s three maxims of common understanding. I have argued that these three 
maxims are, in fact, three different formulations of one and the same maxim. Its adoption 
involves a very sophisticated thought experiment which helps us partially protect ourselves 
from manipulation. 
 
Abstract 
 
In my thesis, I argue (1) that Kant’s pragmatical anthropology and empirical 
psychology can provide us with an explanation why people are susceptible to 
manipulation. I show that people’s susceptibility to manipulation can be explained by some 
defects in cognition and volition, namely prejudices, passions and affects. From a Kantian 
perspective, the manipulative techniques are efficient because they are essentially 
interwoven with the underlying principles of social order. I also argue (2) that Kant’s 
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maxims of common understanding can help us to partially protect ourselves from the 
deteriorating effects of manipulation by establishing personal autonomy. I show that the 
adoption of the maxims of common understanding involves a very sophisticated thought 
experiment which helps us fight with prejudices and calm our affects and passions. My 
project can be summed up as the reconstruction of Kant’s theory of manipulation. 
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